Abstract-In dynamic and uncertain environments, where the needs of security and information availability are difficult to balance, an access control approach based on a static policy will be suboptimal regardless of how comprehensive it is. Risk-based approaches to access control attempt to address this problem by allocating a limited budget to users, through which they pay for the exceptions deemed necessary. So far the primary focus has been on how to incorporate the notion of budget into access control rather than what or if there is an optimal amount of budget to allocate to users. In this paper we discuss the problems that arise from a sub-optimal allocation of budget and introduce a generalised characterisation of an optimal budget allocation function that maximises organisations expected benefit in the presence of self-interested employees and costly audit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control is challenging in an organisational setting. On one hand employees need enough access to perform their tasks, while on the other hand more access will bring about an increasing risk of misuse -either intentionally, where an employee uses the access for personal benefit, or unintentionally through carelessness, losing the information or being socially engineered to give access to an adversary.
The approaches to access control have traditionally focused on technological means (i.e., policy models, policy enforcement and usage audit/monitoring tools) to ensure employees cannot misuse their assigned privileges. At the core of these approaches is the assumption that a security policy can be specified a priori and maintained correctly. This thinking however has led to access control systems that are too rigid and restrictive [1] , [2] , [3] and fail to align the incentives of selfish insiders [4] , [5] . Problems arise because in an organization various tasks are usually performed by different individuals, each of whom has special information (i.e., expertise) concerning his particular sphere of activity. Usually this information is not cheaply 1 (in terms of time and effort) available to others to correctly determine what privileges employees may need to complete their tasks. Further, there may be divergence of preferences between the action an employee considers optimal and what action is optimal for the organisation. This divergence arises because when making a decision employees also seek to maximize their own self-interest; this becomes particularly problematic when they draw personal benefit from misusing the organisation's resources.
To rectify the problem of rigidity of access control models, exception handling mechanisms are introduced to allow employees to escalate their normal privileges. The premise is that allowing exceptions ensures unpredicted (access) needs are fulfilled, while through audit misuses are detected and punished to deter the fraudulent usage of exceptions 2 . Although in simple situation complete audit may be possible, in which case a solution can be achieved by penalizing dysfunctional behaviour, generally however, full observation and verification of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly, especially when there is abundance of exceptions. This contention is supported by the results of several studies [6] , [7] , [8] , including an empirical study of access logs of eight Norwegian hospitals by Røstad et al., [9] , [10] which report that clinicians' use of exceptions that can override access requests denied by the access control system is widespread. Indeed, they found that 74% of the staff were assigned the permission to override denied access requests and 54% of active health records (i.e. those accessed in a one month period) had been accessed through the exception mechanism [9] . They note that the sheer number of accesses via exception has made monitoring (audit) and misuse prevention (detection) an arduous task. Moreover, even when the number of exceptions are manageable, due to the lack of contextual information it is very costly to establish misuses. Hence, an unintended consequence of employing exception mechanisms is that those staff who either maliciously or inadvertently escalate their privileges are unlikely to be held accountable [11] , [1] , [12] . The lack of accountability adversely affects the functionality of most recent flexible authorisation models, such as optimistic [13] , risk-based [14] or break the glass [15] , which require employees performance (i.e., through actions and outcomes) to be auditable so that appropriate punishment (reward) is employed as major deterrence (appeasement) of selfish (cooperative) behaviour [5] .
Our work is motivated by the problems that arise when audit and misuse detection is either impossible or prohibitively costly. Specifically, we assume it is often difficult, if not impossible, to find out (even after the fact) whether the exception was really needed. The asymmetry of information that arises from an inability to determine the validity of exceptions gives employees opportunities to exploit exceptions to draw private benefit. The problem as stated above is analogous to the subset of frauds consumers are concerned about when purchasing credence goods [16] . These are goods and services where the service provider (expert) knows more about the quality the consumer needs than consumers themselves. Examples include services provided by mechanics, taxi drivers or doctors, where in all cases consumers face a similar information problem. They worry about paying for services they did not receive (e.g., a mechanic may fraudulently claim a part has been repaired) or to receive goods/services they did not need in the first place (e.g., doctors recommending unnecessary tests) [17] . In credence goods models, customers usually try to determine the optimal amount of service by taking into account their information about their needs and expert's characteristics (e.g., liability), rather than contracting on the service they receive. In our setting, experts are the employees who know more precisely whether an exception is required to complete a task and the consumer is the organisation that due to cost (time) constraints can neither establish ex ante nor ex post if an exceptional access is actually needed.
In this paper we analyse the effect of costly audit on exception misuses in organisations using a simple model with two type of agents, supervisor and employees, both with limited capacity (time) to perform tasks. We assume that the supervisor is provided with incentives to always act in the organisation's interest, they are trusted, while employees may have incentives to misuse the privileges assigned to them. We further assume that the organisation has a limited monetary resources to employ supervisors or employees and a supervisor's salary is higher than an employee. We then ask the following two related questions: i) assuming the number of employees and supervisors are fixed, given the chances of finding out about employees fraudulent usage of exceptions are slim (and employees know this), how many exceptions to authorise for employees, who have vested interest in misusing such exceptions? ii) given the organisations resources to hire employees and supervisors is limited, what is the optimal number of employees/supervisors to employ? Our objective is to generalise these questions and provide the characteristics of the optimal employment strategy and optimal allocation of exception budget.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II we will provide an account of related works, focusing on the recent risk-based access control models. Section III provides a motivating scenario, comparing the outcome of a rigid traditional access control with no exception mechanism and more recent models which incorporate such a mechanism. We discuss the potential source of over-entitlement and under-entitlement problems. In Section IV we extend the motivating scenario and provide a numerical representation of the advantages of a budget-based access control model. Finally, Section V shows how the simple budge-based model we proposed can be generalised and an optimal number of employees/supervisors to employ as well as the optimal amount of budget for employees can be determined.
II. RELATED WORKS
The MITRE Jason Report [1] notes that organisations deal with inflexible access control systems using various ad-hoc means such as providing near-blanket access rights or "temporary" authorisations that are never revoked. They suggest there is a need for a parameterisable control that governs a trade-off between security and operational needs. To address this, the report recommends that a new authorisation model must focus on risk and they introduce the concept of risk tokenisation, where a token is something with exchange value that the holder can trade for access. The tokenisation of risk allows for greater flexibility as it allows limited access to classified information by uncleared users when such access is so important that the holder of a token is willing to pay the price. Following this paradigm, several risk-based models have been proposed.
Cheng et al. [14] introduced a Risk-Adaptive Access Control (RAC) based on Bell-LaPadulla's Multilevel Security model (MLS) [18] . Inspired by RAC, Ni et al. [19] , also proposed a more general model to define risk based on fuzzy inference techniques. Cheng et al., introduce a flexible gap between allow and deny, where transactions that are denied in the MLS model may be allowed using some additional risk mitigation mechanisms. To quantify the risk of information leakage, the value of information is defined to be the potential maximum damage sustained if the information is disclosed in an unauthorised manner. To determine the probability of unauthorised disclosure, which requires predicting future user behaviour, they assume in MLS such probability would be higher when a person without security clearance is given access to top secret information and lower if the person has a top secret clearance. They adopt the notion of risk tokens which token-holders can trade for extra privileges. Molloy et al., [20] focus on how much token shall be allocated to individuals to cap the aggregated organisational risk while maximising information flow within an organisation. They turn to market mechanisms and suggest that the organisation must set up a risk token market where it releases a fixed number of risk tokens that can be traded by users amongst themselves using the internal currency issued to them. They assume the information objects are accessed to produce benefits which are enumerated in terms of the internal currency. Liu et al. [4] attempt to reduce the risk incurred by authorised users (insiders) who pursue risky actions (e.g., visiting malicious websites). They propose allocating a predefined risk budget to users for tasks they must perform and reward those who perform their tasks while consuming less than the allocated budget, while punishing those who exhaust their budget before completing their tasks. In this way the cost of risky actions is shifted from the organisation to the users. In our previous work [21] we proposed a budget-based authorisation model where employees had to pay not only for exceptions but for all their resource access. We formally showed how a traditional RBAC model can be employed as a reference point to discriminate between users to individualise permission costs and to allocate budget to users. We established that monitoring and analysis of user's budgets provides a uniform mechanism for detecting misuses, hence reduces the administration cost. Further, there would be an upper-bound on the damage each user can incur to the system and as a side effect denial of service and impersonation attacks are constrained by the users' (finite) budgets.
Although the above approaches provide insight into aspects of formulating the authorisation decision as a risk management problem, they fall short in addressing what is the optimal amount of (risk) budget to allocate to employees. They consider the risk to be the scarce resource and attempt to allow [14] or motivate [4] employees to take risk (i.e., use exceptions) up to an arbitrarily adjusted threshold. Furthermore, like the optimistic approach [13] and break-the-glass model [15] , risk-based models implicitly assume that monitoring and audit techniques are in place to detect and punish mis-behaviour. Hence it is unclear whether organisations still benefit from such models when employees can be self-interested (i.e., they will misuse their access permissions when the expected payoff from doing so outweighs acting honestly -not misusing) and monitoring and audit is prohibitively costly.
For example Cheng et al. [14] base the allocation of risk tokens on a subject's clearance level -the higher the clearance level, the more risk tokens they receive. A problem arises when a high clearance individual decides to misuse such privileges. With a large allocation they can do considerable (though bounded) damage. Further, the idea that allowing access to the highest acceptable risk (i.e., to improve information sharing) would imply that maximum sharing of information is an objective for the system, while in reality, information is shared to satisfy an objective, and when there is no known benefit in sharing, there may not be a reason to share even if there are no known risks.
In this work we will abstract from the proposed authorisation models and focus on the characteristics of an optimal level of exception to authorise in a profit maximising organisation. The existence of an optimal level of exception indicates that even under circumstances where self-interested employees misuses can not be detected organisations may still benefit from the provision of limited exception privileges.
III. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
We consider a simple scenario involving the operation of a hospital, as initially described by Røstad et al. [9] in their field study. The hospital consists of a ward manager, a supervisor (she), and employees (he). For now we formulate our problem as a game between a supervisor, who is the only delegator of permissions and has incentives to act on behalf of the hospital's interest (i.e., trusted and does not misuse permissions) and employees, who on the other hand may have private incentives to misuse the permissions assigned to them.
Each employee either requires a normal (already assigned) permission (n) or a high permission (h) (i.e. an exception) to complete a task, simply referred to as n or h task, e.g., consider an employee, Alice, who submits a print job, we refer to the task of printing as normal (n) task if the permission to access the printer is already assigned to Alice, otherwise it is a high (h) task. In this regard, the high permission does not necessarily relate to more sensitive information in our context. The supervisor knows that there is a task to be completed but does not know whether it is n or h. She only knows that there is an ex ante probability of η that the task is h and with (1 − η) probability it is n. The employee on the other hand, being the care provider is able to determine the type of the task with certainty. But he can either acquire an appropriate permission to complete the task: [n|n] or [h|h] (where | denotes conditional on needing), or he may attempt to exploit the information asymmetry by defrauding the supervisor through requesting [h|n] (i.e., we eliminate [n|h] as type of exploitation). Hence forth, we assume that h is sufficient for performing both tasks, while n is only sufficient for normal tasks. Therefore, when an employee fraudulently requests [h|n], he can complete the normal task and also draw some private benefit, which makes defrauding the supervisor an interesting option for employees.
Given the above simple scenario Table I represents the gross utility of the supervisor based on the type of permission the employee needed to complete a task and the permission actually allocated to him. If the permission allocated is sufficient the supervisor receive a utility v, representing the benefit from the completed task. Otherwise she gets 0. The inefficiencies that we are interested in are two fold, over-entitlement and under-entitlement. The former case is on the upper right corner of the table. Note that over-entitlement is not detected by the supervisor (v = v) and hence cannot be ruled out by administering appropriate punishment for the employees who exploit the system by fraudulently using [h|n] . The case of under-entitlement is on the lower left corner of the table. In reality the supervisor attempts to prevent this case, which may translate to patients going untreated due to an employee's insufficient permissions. The under-entitlement problem has been overlooked in the security and access control literature as it primarily concerns the satisfaction of objectives other than security, i.e., operability, usability, monetary profit. Let us now assume that β = 1/2 to be the exogenously given probability that an employee will attempt to exploit the information asymmetry by requesting [h|n] and (1 − β) be the probability that he does not do so. Also assume that if such fraudulent requests are allowed (i.e., upper right corner of the table) the hospital incurs a cost c (even though it may only be realised in the future). Further, consider a single time period in which there is one supervisor who can perform only one task and four employees, each of whom can perform two tasks, either high or low. Hence, the set of tasks to be performed is T = {nn, nh, hn, hh}. The ultimate objective of the organisation is to maximise v (value from the tasks completed, both low and high) while minimizing the cost c.
Given a traditional access control model (e.g., RBAC [22] ) where no exceptions are allowed, only normal tasks can be completed by the employees and the supervisor has time to complete only one h task, hence the hospital draw an expected benefit equal to 5v and four units of employees time remain unused. However, when an exception handling mechanism (e.g., break the glass [15] ) is in place, since the exceptions are authorised and audited later we can assume full access is given to employees (η = 1), hence the total benefit from completed tasks is 8v, the supervisor's time (one unit) is wasted while employee's time is totally utilised. Note however, since β = 1/2 (the chance that employees exploit their information advantage), the organisation's expected benefit is 8v −2c: for the employee who is performing two normal tasks nn, the expected cost for the hospital would be 0.5c + 0.5c (i.e., similar reasoning applies to those performing nh and hn). Hence it can be deduced that for the exception model to have an expected benefit the following condition must be hold, c < 4v.
In the next section we informally introduce a budget-based access control model and show through a limited allocation of budget to employees the model out performs the above mentioned models.
IV. BUDGET-BASED APPROACH
We consider a budget-based approach to access control, in which employees must pay for h tasks (i.e., to acquire exceptional access) through the exception budget (i.e., an internal currency that we refer to as budget for short) b ≥ 0, allocated to them by the supervisor. Intuitively, supervisors may have a limited capacity (time) to perform all the h tasks themselves, hence the options are to either forgo the potential value (v) from completing the excess h tasks or allocate a limited amount of budget to employees so they can complete these tasks (i.e., [h|h]). Obviously, as stated before, by doing this there is also a chance that employees misuse the resources [h|n]. Hence, it is important to allocate budget to employees such that they have only enough budget to complete h tasks and no more (i.e., what we refer to as optimal).
Given the models introduced in the previous section, it is simple to see that when b = 0 (i.e., employees have no budget), the expected benefit from the budget-based model is identical to the model where no exception is allowed, and when b > η.T , it is identical to the model with exception mechanism. Now assume that employees are allocated only a limited budget, b = 1, everything else being equal the expected benefit from employing the budget-based model, as shown in Table II , is strictly higher than the access control model with exception mechanism. The budget-based model also performs better than the traditional model where no exception is allowed, unless the cost of misuse c is high -precisely c > 16v. Generally speaking, where the traditional model suffers from under-entitlement problem (b < η.T ) and the model with exception mechanism suffers from over-entitlement problem (b > η.T ) the budget-based model attempts to provide just enough budget for all h tasks to be completed (b = η.T ). 
Given the above simple example we can observe that in the budget-based model the decision to authorise an exception is transformed into an optimisation problem that can be fairly dynamic: instead of pre-allocation of rights (i.e., or risk budget in risk-based models such as [14] ) solely based on users trustworthiness (i.e., clearance or roles) which is a common practice, the decision is directly dependant on the factors such as, the number of tasks to be completed, the probability that such tasks actually require exception, the value for completing a task, the cost of misuse, the probability of misuse and the supervisors capacity to perform h tasks rather then delegating them to employees. Given these factors, we can make some general observations such as the amount of budget to be allocated to employees must be inversely related to c, β and the supervisor's capacity to perform the tasks, while the magnitude of the allocated budget is positively related to η and v. For example, consider a hospital where four supervisors are present instead of one that we originally assumed, in such a case the optimal decision for the budget-based model would be to reject all exceptions by employees and let the supervisors to handle all h tasks (i.e., as 8v ≥ 8v − 0.5c).
We can take the analysis of the existing authorisation policies one step further to determine the optimal one given a situation at hand. To make the exposition more descriptive, let us assume that supervisors will always utilise their available time, hence in the model with exception the expected benefit would be 9v −2c, hence the comparison of this policy with the budget based policy becomes more interesting. In this case, by comparing the expected benefit of each model we can make the following policy choices:
The obvious question is whether the above simple example can be generalised such that the hiring of supervisors and employees to be organisation's choice: what is the optimal number of supervisors, or employees to be hired and and how much is the optimal exception budget to be allocated to employees?
V. GENERALISATION
Recall that η is the probability that an employee requires high permission (h) to complete a task. If an employee only requires low permission but has a high permission he or she can misuse this permission and will do so with β -a probability that captures the employees' (behavioural) likelihood of doing so. We assume that supervisors -for reasons of better pay or a more elaborate selection process will never misuse information. Let e denote the number of employees and s to be the number of supervisors -think of these as basic employees in a hospital and senior staff members. We assume that employees have a capacity to perform n tasks per period of time (month, year). The supervisor's capacity is σn with σ ∈ (0, 1). Services can in principle be provided by either an employee or a supervisor. We will first assume that the number of supervisors and employees is given and ask how many cases can optimally be dealt with, taking into account the risk of information misuse. This will inform us about the maximum capacity to provide services given a set of resources. We will next ask, what is the optimal policy if the demand for services is given by T -in the hospital story this could be the demand for information sensitive treatments -and the organisation can decide about the number of employees and supervisors it wants to hire. In this case we assume the employee's wage is 1 and the supervisors wage is w > 1, to allow for a wage differential.
A. Optimal high permission budget
For notation, let H be a random variable that denote the number of tasks that require h permission, and b be the budget for h permissions an employee holds, then the expected number of misuse cases by employee given a budget allocated to them, denoted by µ(b) is as follows:
Given the binomial nature of this problem, we can numerically determine this value as
The expected number of tasks that can be completed by one employee given he has b budget to access h data is equal to: In words, if H ≤ b then an employee can serve all jobs, if H > b he can perform b task requiring h permission and the expected number of tasks out of n that require low access. In any case, the number of cases a supervisor can do is σn, he or she can either pick up cases not done by employees or do extra cases.
Let us assume the value of a case served is v and the cost of a case of data misuse is c, then determining the optimal amount of budget to allocate to employees in order to maximise the profit to the firm is given as: n−1 c the optimal policy is not to provide any h access to employees and if Pr(H = n)v > (µ(b = n) − µ(b = n − 1))c the optimal policy is to provide full access to all employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the question of optimal budget allocation in the emerging budget-based access control models. We showed that a static budget allocation, that is solely based on employees trustworthiness and organisation's risk appetite may lead to over-entitlement or under-entitlement problems. We established that the allocation of budget must be context dependant: employees are only provided with exception budget if there are not enough (trusted) supervisors to perform the tasks that require exception and the expected benefit from authorising exception (to complete tasks) out weights the expected cost of employees' permission misuse. We proposed a generalised budget allocation function and showed that given the context information it is always numerically possible to determine the optimal budget.
